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Within social psychology, group identification refers to a mental process that leads an 
individual to conceive of herself as a group member. This phenomenon has recently attracted 
a great deal of attention in the debate about shared agency. In this debate, group 
identification is appealing to many because it appears to explain important forms of 
intentionally shared actions in a cognitively unsophisticated way. This paper argues that, 
unless important issues about group identification are not illuminated, the heuristic function 
ascribed to this notion for an understanding of shared agency remains dubious at best and 
unfulfilled at worst. This paper offers such a clarification by distinguishing and describing 
two different mental processes that constitute group identification: adoption of the group 
perspective and transformation in self-understanding. It is claimed that the latter process 
consists in the production of what Ruth Millikan labels “Pushmi-Pullyu representations” and 
that it is developmentally prior with respect to the ability of adopting the group perspective. 
 






Philosophical arguments (Schweikard & Schmid, 2013) and empirical evidence (Tomasello 
et al., 2005) support the idea that the capacity to engage in joint actions is a key aspect of 
human sociality. It is generally agreed in the literature that joint actions can be explained by 
shared intentions: In order for an action to be shared among several individuals, this action 
must be triggered, steered, and monitored by an intention that is shared by those individuals 
(Bratman, 1993, 2014). For instance, two individuals walk together (rather than simply in 
parallel) if those individuals share the intention of walking together (Gilbert, 1990).  
However, it has also been convincingly argued that agents need to exercise complex 
cognitive abilities in order to share intentions (Tollefsen, 2005; Butterfill, 2012). This 
observation opens up an explanatory gap, as it puts pressure on the idea that joint actions 
among creatures who arguably do not yet possess those abilities (e.g., children of 18-24 
months of age) can be explained by shared intentions. Recently, Elizabeth Pacherie (2013) 
has made an important attempt to salvage that idea by developing a cognitively undemanding 
theory of shared intentions which crucially invokes the socio-psychological concept of group 
identification (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1982; Brewer & Kramer, 1997).1 This concept 
has also been used by Bjorn Petersson (2017) to show that not only joint actions among 
  
young children but all joint actions performed by individuals as full-fledged group members 
(or in the “we-mode,” see Tuomela, 2007) require group identification. 
This paper reviews the conception of group identification that circulates within the 
philosophical debate on joint action. It claims that it is deficient and replaces it with a 
different account, which cashes it out in terms of Ruth Millikan’s notion of “Pushmi-Pullyu 
representations” (hereafter ‘PPR’) (Millikan, 2004, 2005). Our alternative account of group 
identification dispenses with the notion of shared intentions in explaining minimal joint 
actions by claiming that, when a subject has group-identified, she has activated a PPR: This 
representation simultaneously describes the subject as group member and concomitantly 
motivates her to act as such. 
This alternative account of group identification is developed in three steps. In the next 
section, we discuss Pacherie’s and Petersson’s understanding of group identification, 
according to which subjects who have group-identified can share intentions which enable the 
initiation of joint actions. Subjects group-identify when at least two conditions are jointly 
satisfied: The subject conceives of herself as group member, and she has adopted the group’s 
perspective, or the we-perspective. 
In Section 3, we dismiss this view of group identification and its role in explaining 
joint actions by distinguishing two mutually independent processes. First, we review work in 
developmental and social psychology which suggests that it is unlikely that children younger 
than three years of age are able to adopt the group or we-perspective. Second, by discussing 
the “discursive dilemma” in social choice theory (List & Pettit, 2011), we show that an adult 
who has adopted the group perspective can contribute to a joint action even without 
understanding herself as group member. We conclude that if group identification is supposed 
to explain joint actions of the cognitively less demanding type, then this notion ought to be 
defined solely in terms of the subject’s self-understanding as group member. But how is that 
possible? 
In Section 4, we provide an answer to this question. We contend that acquiring this 
specific self-understanding is not a doxastic process: To conceive of oneself as a group 
member is not to acquire a new belief; rather, it consists in forming a PPR. PPRs are mental 
states that simultaneously describe the world and direct behavior. Accordingly, when the 
subject has acquired the particular self-understanding required for a joint action, the 
corresponding PPR describes the subject as group member and motivates her to act as such. 
An important consequence of this idea is that joint actions among pre-school-aged children 
are not fully intentional but, rather, lie on a spectrum “between reason and reflex” (Gendler, 
2012). In the conclusion, we elaborate on three further implications that cashing out the 
notion of self-transformation in terms of PPR has for our understanding of joint actions. 
 
 
2. Group Identification and Collective Intentionality 
 
In a recent paper, Pacherie defended the following “lite,” that is, cognitively undemanding, 
theory of shared intentions: 
 
Two persons P1 and P2 share an intention to A if:  
(i) each has a self-conception as a member of the team T, consisting of P1 and P2 (collective self-framing);  
(i’) each believes (i) (group identification expectation); 
(ii) each reasons that A is the best choice of action for the team (team reasoning from a group viewpoint); 
(iii) each therefore intends to do his part of A (team reasoning from an individual viewpoint). 
 
According to this theory, an intention is shared among two individuals when, in particular, 
two conditions are jointly satisfied. First, according to condition (i), the individual must 
  
conceive of herself as a group member. This consists in applying a collective frame or 
concept to herself. Second, condition (ii) conveys the idea that the individual must be able to 
frame a given agentive scenario from the group’s perspective, which allows her to get a grip 
on the group’s preferences (see Hakli et al., 2010, p. 295 on group preferences).  
Pacherie’s “lite” theory of shared intentions aims at accommodating two important 
insights coming from developmental psychology. The first insight is the indication that 
children, starting from around 18-24 months old, engage in joint agency. The growing body 
of literature on this topic (Brownell, 2011) includes a series of experiments conducted by 
Warneken et al. (2006, 2012), which shows that infants intentionally participate in 
collaborative activities. Interestingly, research has established that from this age onwards, 
skillful coordination is put in the service of a jointly intentional activity, in which the 
interactant is considered as a peer and not as a social tool.2 
The second insight is information about children’s cognitive abilities: Research in 
social cognition indicates that pre-school-aged children have only a limited theory of mind 
(ToM), which is the ability to attribute beliefs to others. Passing the false belief test at the age 
of four has generally been considered the first reliable mark of ToM abilities (Wellman et al., 
2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983; Rakoczy, 2015), but this point is currently the object of 
heated controversy.3 Regardless of when exactly children acquire a ToM, what represents an 
unsurmountable challenge for children of that age is forming recursive beliefs—that is, 
beliefs which range over others’ beliefs about one’s own beliefs (Carpenter & Liebal, 2012, 
p. 165). Based on this evidence, Tollefsen (2005) has convincingly shown that theories of 
shared intentions which put too much emphasis on the agents’ mentalizing abilities fail to 
explain joint actions among children.4 
Since the agents involved in a joint action that is steered by intentions fulfilling (i) to 
(iii) need not activate taxing mindreading abilities, Pacherie concludes that her theory “allows 
shared intentions to be formed by agents who lack sophisticated mentalizing skills” 
(Pacherie, 2013, p. 1834), for instance, children of a young age.5 This claim will be resisted 
in Section 3, where we argue that by demanding (i-ii) to be jointly satisfied, this theory is too 
heavy-duty to explain joint actions among children. This consideration sets the stage for the 
claim made in Section 4, according to which, if condition (i) is understood as modelling a 
PPR, then (i) alone can elicit a joint action.  
Before evaluating Pacherie’s theory, however, it is important to appreciate how the 
notion of group identification has been applied to explain not only joint actions among 
infants, but all cases of joint actions performed by individuals as group members. Recently, 
Petersson (2017) has discussed group identification in relation to the Hi-Lo. The Hi-Lo is a 
one-shot coordination game, which is regarded as a problem for classical game theory: The 
players maximize their utilities only if they coordinate; however, there are two ways of 
coordinating, and one (Hi-Hi) is better than the other (Lo-Lo). Yet, given that the only 
recommendation game theory can issue is to choose what the player predicts the other player 
will choose, classical game theory does not seem to be in a position to recommend (Hi-Hi) 
(see Guala, forthcoming).  
One way to solve the problem is the following: If the game is considered from the 
perspective of a group rather than from the perspective of the two individual players, a 
recommendation for (Hi-Hi) can be justified within game theory. From a single group agent’s 
point of view, it becomes obvious that (Hi-Hi) is the best option to pursue (Bacharach, 2006). 
Adopting the group’s perspective enables the individual player to ask herself the question 
“What should we do?” and, hence, to engage in team reasoning. In line with Pacherie, 
Petersson claims that subjects adopt the we-perspective when “agency transformation” occurs 
(Petersson 2017, p. 214), and this notion is described in the following terms: “Because such a 
person is thinking of her self as a part of [team T], her conception of the aspect of herself 
  
which is her agent undergoes a transformation…: she thinks of her agential self…as a 
component part of T’s agency” (Bacharach, 2006, p. 136). 
The result of team reasoning is a collective or shared intention, which can be 
formulated as follows (Gold & Sugden, 2007, p. 110f): 
 
(1) We intend to J. 
 
Importantly, team reasoners ought to be distinguished from team benefactors (see Tuomela, 
2013, p. 185ff; Hakli et al., 2010). Whereas the first concept captures a full-fledged group 
member, the latter concept models an individual who, from a first-person singular 
perspective, reasons about the well-being of her group and attempts to identify the best 
strategy to maximize her group’s well-being. Team benefactors are unable to ask themselves 
the question “What should we do?” and are thus incapable of forming corresponding intentions 
to answer that question. Typically, their intentions supporting the group’s well-being come in 
the following form: 
 
(2) I intend that we J. 
 
Note that the we-concept is in the content of attitude (2), and, thus, it does not open up 
enough logical space for the attitudes held by the team reasoner—that is, those expressed by 
(1), which have a we-concept in the subject position.  
Let us recapitulate. The notion of group identification has been invoked to explain 
minimal joint actions and actions performed by full-fledged group members. According to 
Pacherie and Petersson, agents form shared intentions and thereby act jointly on them when 
they have group-identified. This happens when at least two conditions are jointly fulfilled: 
The subject has undergone a peculiar transformation in self-understanding (from now on, we 
will call this transformation in self-understanding “self-transformation” for short) and has 
adopted the group perspective. The question we raise in the next section is whether group 
identification, as this is understood in the debate about shared agency, truly delivers on the 
explanatory objectives assigned to it. 
 
 
3.  Adopting “Our” Perspective and Self-Transformation 
 
In this section, we argue that the notion of group identification utilized in the debate about 
joint actions blurs the distinction between two mutually independent processes: adoption of 
the we-perspective and transformation in self-understanding (or “self-transformation”). We 
claim that these processes may run separately from each other and that, in terms of cognitive 
sophistication, the adoption of the we-perspective is more taxing than self-transformation. If 
our considerations are correct, they indicate three things.6 First, Pacherie’s explanation of 
joint actions among children in terms of conditions (i) to (iii) is not as “lite” as it is presented 
to be (see Section 3.1); since it invokes the adoption of the group perspective, it is too heavy-
duty to account for such instances of joint actions. Second, acting upon mental states like (1) 
may or may not be accompanied by transformation in self-understanding; under certain 
circumstances, the adoption of the group’s perspective alone may enable that (see Section 
3.2). Third, an alternative theory of group identification is needed (this is the topic of Section 
4). 
 
3.1.  Self-Transformation Without the Adoption of Group Perspective 
 
Let us start with the development of joint actions among young children. Considerations from 
  
developmental psychology may show that self-transformation can occur without the adoption 
of a group’s viewpoint. We begin by acknowledging that one pre-condition of the ability to 
adopt another individual’s perspective is the understanding that there are other perspectives, 
and, more specifically, that there is something like a group perspective. In a recent paper, 
Henderson and colleagues (2013) support the claim that 10-month-old children already 
understand groups’ perspectives because they can represent collaborative activities as such 
(i.e., as activities that pursue a collective goal, or we-goal) without engaging in such 
activities. However, understanding a perspective does not entail adopting that perspective by 
considering it as an element to factor in action and deliberation.  
When do children start to adopt the we-perspective, then? Behavior that displays the 
black sheep effect (Abrams et al., 2009) can be considered one reliable indicator of this 
ability. This effect is most visible in the way in which loyalty or disloyalty to a group is 
assessed: It is present when likeable (e.g., loyal) behavior of in-group members is praised 
more than similar behavior by out-group members, and deviant (e.g., disloyal) behavior of in-
group members is punished more severely than similar behavior by out-group members. 
Importantly, the tokens of behavior that are assessed do not differ in their properties. To put 
this differently, there is nothing that makes these tokens of behavior intrinsically better or 
worse. This indicates that the assessments of the behavior in question diverge when the 
perspective of the group is factored in: A loyal action toward a group G is assessed as more 
praiseworthy than loyal actions toward other groups only from G’s perspective. Conversely, a 
deviant action toward G is assessed as more blameworthy than deviant actions toward other 
groups, again, only from G’s perspective. Based on this idea, the following can be predicted: 
 
Specifically, children…should favor peers they believe will be evaluated highly by other in-group members rather 
than out-group members. This is an important point because it requires children to attune their own evaluation of a 
peer not only to the overall social desirability of that peer’s actions but to the differences in evaluations they 
believe will be made by in-group versus out-group members. (Abrams et al. 2009, p. 225) 
 
The black sheep effect signals that a child has acquired social competence to frame 
her social environment from the group’s perspective: This includes knowledge of what to 
expect and what is expected of peers in inter-group situations, know-how about group 
processes such as loyalty, conformity pressure, and groups showing in-group biases. This 
competence also provides a basis for inferring that members of other groups will favor their 
own group and that children with better perspective-taking skills expect in-group members to 
be more likely, but out-group members less likely, to share their own views about the two 
groups (see Abrams & Rutland, 2008). 
Although mature manifestations of the black sheep effect appear when children reach 
the age of eight (Abrams et al., 2009), precursory forms seem to emerge by the age of three 
(see Schmidt et al., 2011). By that age, children accomplish what has been called a shift 
toward a “sociocentric mode of reasoning” (Dunham & Emory, 2014): They begin to 
appreciate group membership and to display in-group favoritism, which becomes fully 
manifest only from the age of six.7 This body of evidence may be taken to indicate that the 
ability to adopt a group perspective emerges later than the appearance of joint actions at the 
age of 18-24 months, meaning that the explanation of those actions cannot invoke the 
adoption of the we-perspective. However, under the assumption that an explanation of joint 
actions among infants requires group identification, the sense of “group identification” that is 
at stake here can only be self-transformation, not adoption of the we-perspective. Section 4 
corroborates this idea, but for now it suffices to establish a first interim conclusion: Self-
transformation can occur without the adoption of the group perspective. 
However, note that this conclusion is both conditional and defeasible. It is conditional 
because it cannot be excluded that the adoption of the group perspective which manifests in 
  
phenomena like the black sheep effect is not the same kind as the perspective-taking that 
underpins joint actions. However, our line of argument runs on the assumption that we are 
dealing with one and the same process. It is also defeasible because our suggestion does not 
exclude the possibility that younger children not only have a basic form of understanding of 
the group perspective, but that they can also adopt that perspective—even though this 
psychological process does not manifest itself behaviorally in the black sheep effect and in 
cognate phenomena before the age of three (for currently unknown reasons). 
 
3.2.  Adoption of Group Perspective Without Self-Transformation 
 
Let us now turn our attention to our converse claim regarding the possibility for an individual 
to adopt the we-perspective without self-transformation. This possibility may be illustrated 
by a paradox in social choice theory called the ‘discursive dilemma’. Imagine a political 
committee that seeks to form a preference on the following propositions (the propositions 
have been adapted from List & Pettit, 2011, p. 46): 
 
 (a) taxes are increased (proposition ‘P’), 
 (b) spending is reduced (proposition ‘Q’), and 
 (c) taxes are increased, or spending is reduced (so that there is no budget  
deficit) (‘P or Q’). 
 
Assume that the committee members have the following preferences on the matter and that 
the votes are aggregated following the majority principle: 
 
 Proposition ‘p’ Proposition ‘q’ Proposition ‘p or q’ 
Individual 1 Preferred Dispreferred Preferred 
Individual 2 Dispreferred Preferred Preferred 
Individual 3 Dispreferred Dispreferred Dispreferred 
Majority Dispreferred Dispreferred Preferred 
 
The matrix above reports that the group prefers that taxes are increased or spending is 
reduced, although the group is averse to both taxes being increased and spending being 
reduced. Obviously, this is an inconsistent outcome which puts the group in front of a hard 
choice or dilemma: should the majority principle be preserved and ‘P or Q’ be preferred, or 
should consistency between the group’s preferences be preserved and ‘P or Q’ be 
dispreferred? To be rational, in this case, the group has to disprefer the third proposition, 
although this is preferred by the majority of the group’s members. Hence, groups that intend 
to preserve rationality may sometimes end up in a situation in which they hold preferences 
that the majority of their members do not endorse.8 
The political committee example concerns the aggregation of preferences as a specific 
kind of pro-attitude, but Pettit and List show that the discursive dilemma applies to 
intentional attitudes in general (see List, 2014). It applies not only to doxastic attitudes like 
beliefs (List & Pettit, 2011), but also to intentions (Schweikard & Pettit, 2006). However, 
how do members comply with the intention of a group which is not their intention? 
The most natural and spontaneous way to achieve closure between the group’s and the 
individual’s attitudes is for the individual to “identify” with the group (List & Pettit, 2011, p. 
  
191f). Once that perspective is adopted, the individual forms the following attitude: 
 
(1) We intend to J. 
 
That is, the group’s attitude becomes the individual’s own attitude (List & Pettit, 2011, p. 
192), and this mental state directly motivates her to act accordingly.9 Yet, there may also be 
indirect ways in which the individual’s and the group’s attitudes can come to closure—ways 
that do not require the adoption of the group perspective, or so List and Pettit argue (List & 
Pettit, 2011, p. 191). Here, the individual may even have a different attitude, for example, 
 
(3) I do not intend to J. 
 
She can hold this attitude while also including (1) in her pool of motivations. This possibility 
leads some authors to claim that “the human constituents of group agents are typically sites of 
rational fragmentation” (Rovane, 2017). Here, we sidestep the debate on whether it is rational 
for the individual members to stick to (and not to revise) attitudes like (3) in this scenario (see 
Szigeti, 2014). What matters to us is the psychological possibility of an individual subject 
concomitantly entertaining attitudes of forms (1) and (3). 
Now, if (1) captures a reason for action, then the attitude at stake must have 
motivational force. But how can the reason expressed by (1) “win the motivational 
competition” with (3) (Frankfurt, 1971)? There may be several factors at play here (and the 
following disjunctions are not meant to be exclusive): (1) may generate obligations with 
which the individuals comply (see Gilbert, 1997) or (1) may be accompanied by a form of 
cognitive achievement, for example, “I act in the group’s name because, on detecting that a 
relevant member ought to take a certain action, I recognize that I am that member and thereby 
form the desire that I perform the action” (List & Pettit, 2011, p. 191). Another possibility is 
highlighted by Tollefsen: 
 
These reasons become reasons for an individual only after one recognizes that the group has reasons to adopt a 
certain conclusion. Thus, whatever reasons an individual might have to accept a decision that goes against his or her 
personal opinion on the matter is parasitic on the group’s reasons. It is only when individuals recognize that “we” 
will be adopting a policy or decision that is inconsistent with prior or present commitments that they may come to 
see themselves as having reasons to accept a conclusion they do not personally endorse. (Tollefsen, 2002, p. 38f) 
 
In this case, (1) wins over (3) because the individual realizes that that attitude is rational—
rational, that is, from the group’s perspective. Because it is rational for us to J, I will 
contribute to J. However, how does the individual gain the insight that (1) is an attitude that 
is rational from the group’s point of view—in contradistinction to her own viewpoint 
expressed by (3)? 
We contend that this is made possible by a process of perspective-taking. To clarify the 
sense in which we claim that the individual in the scenario portrayed by Tollefsen is acting 
and reasoning from the group’s perspective, it is helpful to describe two different ways in 
which perspectives can be taken. This distinction is put forward by Peter Goldie, who labels 
these two forms of perspective-taking as in-his-shoes perspective-taking and empathetic 
perspective-shifting (sometimes also called ‘empathy’ tout court; see Goldie, 2000). Here is 
how Goldie introduces this distinction: 
 
If A is wondering what B will decide in some situation, it will be in-his-shoes perspective-taking if A imagines 
himself in that situation, imagines himself deliberating and deciding what to do … . In contrast, it will be empathetic 
perspective-shifting if A imagines being B in that situation, deliberating and deciding what to do. (Goldie, 2011, p. 
305) 
 
In this quote, ‘B’ refers to an individual, but Goldie’s distinction seems applicable to cases in 
  
which it is a group’s perspective that is taken by an individual. If transported at the collective 
level, the in-his-shoes perspective-taking may be contended to be the stance exemplified by 
group members who are stuck in a discursive dilemma before closure and thus occupy states 
(1) and (3) concomitantly. In such cases, the individual puts herself in the shoes of the group: 
she observes the world by confronting herself with the situation in the way that this situation 
is faced by the group. She then forms the attitudes that are rational from the group’s point of 
view (1), while still maintaining her first-person singular perspective on the matter (3).10 
In contrast, empathetic perspective-shifting can be associated with the intentional 
structure that is exemplified by somebody who fully identifies with the group perspective and 
endorses (1) by acting on it without reservation, that is, without forming (3). 
However, that which closes the gap between the group’s and the individual’s 
attitudes, making it possible for in-his-shoes perspective-taking to become empathetic 
perspective-shifting, cannot be the adoption of the group’s perspective, for in both scenarios, 
the individual is adopting the perspective of the group. Our suggestion is that the difference is 
made precisely by self-transformation as a distinct process with respect to perspective-taking: 
It is because the individual subjectively identifies with the group that a gap does not open up 
between the group attitudes and those of the individual.  
Let us take stock. The second section discussed two important classes of joint actions: 
joint actions among infants and joint actions performed by individuals as group members. 
Pacherie and Petersson claim that group identification can explain these actions. This claim is 
sustained by the idea that this process does not require complex mentalizing skills and that it 
enables the formation of collective intentions via team reasoning.  
In this section, we argued for three conclusions. The first conclusion is negative: the 
claim about the explanatory role of group identification is at best underdetermined, for it 
collates two distinct processes (self-transformation and adoption of the we-perspective) under 
the label of ‘group identification,’ which ought to be kept separated. They ought to be kept 
separated because they can and do come apart. This relates to our second conclusion, which 
can be formulated in positive terms as a taxonomy of joint actions. It is important to stress 
that this taxonomy is not supposed to be exhaustive: it merely captures the kinds of joint 
actions we have tackled in this paper. The first category encompasses joint actions to which 
agents contribute as full-fledged group members. Here, self-transformation and the adoption 
of the we-perspective are indeed jointly required to achieve closure between the group 
attitudes and those of the individual.11 The second category includes joint actions to which 
agents do not contribute as full-fledged group members. The agent’s contribution requires 
only the ability to adopt the we-perspective, not self-transformation (in fact, no closure is 
achieved here between the group attitudes and those of the individual). Finally, the third 
category is populated by minimal joint actions, like those among infants (emerging around 
18-24 months of age). In Section 3, we question whether these actions are fully intentional, 
but for the time being we simply intend to establish that, for their explanation, these actions 
necessitate self-transformation alone. The motivation backing this claim comes from 
considerations about developmental psychology which indicate (with due caution) that one 
cannot expect individual contribution to be explained by the adoption of a group perspective, 
for this develops from the 3rd year of age. Our third conclusion amounts to a clear-cut 
distinction between self-transformation and adoption of the we-perspective. Self-
transformation is a necessary element in the explanation of joint actions which are performed 
by agents as group members; this includes those joint actions to which infants contribute. By 
contrast, adoption of the we-perspective is a sufficient element in the explanation of these 
actions, as it only plays a role in joint actions performed by individuals with fully developed 
mentalizing skills. 
The puzzle we now need to solve concerns our refined characterization of group 
  
identification: how does a self-understanding as group member emerge, and how does it 
contribute to explaining individuals’ participation in joint actions? 
 
 
4.  Self-Transformation and Pushmi-Pullyu Representations 
 
It may be helpful to begin this section with some terminological remarks. As noted above, we 
are using ‘self-transformation’ as an abbreviation of ‘transformation in self-understanding.’ 
Although there are many different understandings an individual could acquire of herself, this 
paper focuses exclusively on the understanding of being a member of a group (us). In line 
with social psychology, we call this specific understanding a social self (Brewer & Kramer, 
1997). This section explores what sort of understanding—or more precisely, what sort of 
representation—the social self is. 
We first want to consider whether the social self is a belief or a descriptive 
representation (‘DER’; see Millikan, 2004). This would be a state linguistically expressible as 
follows: 
 
(4) I am a member of us.  
 
On this understanding, the process of transformation in self-understanding would coincide 
with the acquisition of the belief expressed by (4). However, the doxastic approach to the 
social self does not look promising. 
Our main reason to deny that the social self is a DER is that, in some cases, an 
individual could form a belief like (4) without identifying with the group (see Ruble et al., 
2004; Bennett & Sani, 2008). More precisely, the mere self-ascription of belonging to a 
group does not motivate the individual to act as a group member. This should not come as a 
surprise, for DERs in and of themselves are not directly linked to action. If the social self 
were a DER, then it would be accompanied by a conative attitude to impel the individual of 
who held a belief to action (Davidson, 2001). But what could that conative attitude be? The 
best candidates are either (1) “we intend to J” or (2) “I intend that we J.” Yet, we have seen in 
the previous sections that these two intentions are not apt to play such a motivating role. (2) 
does not motivate one to act as group member or as team reasoner but, rather, as team 
benefactor, whereas (1) requires the capacity to adopt the group’s perspective, which is a 
complex ability that develops from the age of three. Additionally, if the line of thought 
developed in Section 2 is correct, it suggests that the social self alone can trigger action (e.g., 
in young children). 
All of this motivates our contention that the social self is not a thought, a belief, or 
any other kind of DER. Our suggestion is that the social self belongs to a specific class of 
representations—a class which Millikan calls Pushmi-Pullyu Representations (PPRs) 
(Millikan, 2004, 2005). Roughly, PPRs are representational states that are evolutionarily and 
structurally primitive. Moreover, they are intrinsically motivating without being combined 
with a conative state (or a “directive” state, according to Millikan’s terminology). 
PPRs are structurally and evolutionarily more primitive than DERs: 
 
PPRs are more primitive than either purely directive or purely descriptive representations ... The ability to store 
away information for which one has no immediate use (pure description), and to represent goals one does not yet 
know how to act on (pure direction), is surely more advanced than the ability to use simple kinds of [PPRs].” 
(Millikan, 2005, p. 175) 
 
DERs are “combinatoric” in causing behavior in the sense that they need to be combined with 
conative representations such as desires or intentions. PPRs are not: “purely descriptive 
  
representations must be combined with directive representations through a process of 
practical inference in order to be used by the cognitive systems ... The employment of PPRs 
is a much simpler affair” (Millikan, 2005, p. 167). PPRs are not combinatoric because, unlike 
DERs, which simply represent facts, they represent facts and direct behavior at the same 
time. “[PPRs] are signs that are undifferentiated between representing facts and directing 
activities appropriate to those facts. They represent facts and give directions or represent 
goals, both at once” (Millikan, 2004, p. 157). 
 
One of Millikan’s examples is the waggle dance of honey bees. Honey bees in the same 
colony do the dance to share information about the direction and distance to important 
locations, such as the flowers yielding nectar and pollen. The dance is a PPR, according to 
Millikan: it does the job of representing the location of flowers as well as the job of directing 
the behavior of flying to their location. More generally, most of the representations in non-
human animals are PPRs.12 PPRs can be found in human cognitive and behavioral processes 
as well. Examples include perceptions of affordance (Millikan, 2005), representations of 
social norms and roles (Millikan, 2005), agential experiences (Bayne, 2010), moral 
judgments (Tenenbaum, 2006), intuitions (Chudnoff, 2013), emotions (Bayne & Fernandez, 
2008), and so on. 
Note that we are not committed to all the details of Millikan’s theory of mental 
representations. In particular, we do not presuppose her influential (but controversial) account 
of mental content (Millikan, 1989, 2005). Our only assumption is that PPR is a real category 
of mental representation that plays a variety of roles in human and non-human cognitive and 
behavioral processes.  
PPRs have some attractive features in the context of accounting for self-
transformation. First, PPRs are more primitive than DERs, which means that, unlike the 
doxastic account of self-transformation, the PPR account does not require complicated 
cognitive and behavioral machinery. Second, PPRs are not combinatoric in causing behavior, 
which means that, unlike the doxastic account of self-transformation, the PPR account nicely 
explains the fact that self-transformation is intrinsically motivating.13 
To return to our example, the waggle dance is triggered in the presence of relevant 
cues (e.g., flowers), and it initiates the relevant behavioral processes (e.g., another bee’s 
flying to the flowers). We suggest that the process of group identification has a parallel 
structure. Social psychologists have already identified several “group cues” (Pacherie, 2013, 
p. 1832) that are able to trigger group identification. In his survey of the literature, Bacharach 
mentions properties such as belonging to the same social category, having common interests, 
sharing a common fate, facing a competing group, employing we-language, and so on 
(Bacharach, 2006, p. 76), which, once they acquire salience for an individual, may cause 
group identification. 
Social psychology has shown the relevance of all these group cues for explaining 
group identification in adults, but it is debatable whether they are equally important in the 
case of children, given that encoding those properties may require advanced cognitive 
abilities. Exploring this issue would exceed the scope of this paper, but we want to suggest 
that a further kind of cue, which may be particularly relevant from the developmental point of 
view, is derived from partaking in episodes of joint attention. Joint attention is a much-
debated phenomenon, but there seems to be a consensus on following points: first, children 
can engage in joint attention by 12 months of age (Carpenter & Liebal, 2012). Second, joint 
attention is not reducible to parallel episodes of attention, but it involves something else: 
mutual awareness (Eilan, 2005), openness (Campbell, 2012), or some kind of communication 
(Carpenter & Liebal, 2012). Third, and most importantly, joint attention not only enables 
some forms of joint action (Seemann, 2007), but it is also related to proclivity for joint action 
  
to such an extent that some authors think that joint attention has an intrinsically practical 
dimension (see Hobson & Hobson, 2011). In fact, Tollefsen (2005) argues that joint attention 
is part and parcel of what it means to share an intention (in face-to-face interactions) and 
others even claim that joint attention is already a basic form of joint action (Fiebich & 
Gallagher, 2012).  
We think that all these features make joint attention a particularly effective factor in 
triggering self-transformation. In fact, there is only a small step from (a) being aware of 
something together with another individual to (b) being aware of belonging to a group (as 
ephemeral as one wishes), with the other individual partaking in the same episode of joint-
attention: this group would be formed by the co-attenders. Furthermore, this last cue is 
already operative at a very young age, and, finally, the established link between joint 
attention and joint action strongly indicates that sharing an episode of joint attention can 
produce the motivation (the PPR, that is) to pursue a joint action. 
Imagine two children in a kindergarten jointly attending to a toy that no other child is 
playing with. It is possible to think of this episode of joint attention as constituting a group 
cue to the effect that, when it has acquired salience, it signals to each individual child that she 
belongs to the same (minimal) group that the other child belongs to. Following our 
hypothesis, the individuals’ cognitive systems will thereby be activated and produce a social 
self. This PPR, to paraphrase Millikan, means “you are a member of us; act as such.” In other 
words, the system initiates rudimentary patterns of pro-social behavior that are in service of 
cooperation, in the sense that they initiate, support, and facilitate joint activity. (Returning to 
the example, one child may initiate the action by grasping the toy and offering it to the other 
child.) Given that the individual understands herself as a group member, she is lead to 
conceive of the goal of another individual—who she frames as an in-group member—as the 
group’s goal or, rather, as “our” goal. Therefore, she will coordinate, provide help, and stick 
to the goal. Additionally, the other child perceives the action as an invitation to join a game 
and begins to coordinate accordingly. At the same time, and again on the basis of that 
particular self-understanding, her goal will be conceived of as “our” goal—she will expect 
help, and she will expect others to stick to the goal. If one of the children disengages, the 
other might solicit her to re-engage.14  
To be sure, this behavioral repertoire is rudimentary and only allows for simple forms 
of joint actions such as simple forms of helping behavior or actions with complementary 
roles (e.g., pulling opposite ends of a tube to retrieve stickers that are hidden inside, placing a 
ball into a tube and catching it from the other side; see Warneken & Tomasello, 2006, 2007). 
Further mental capacities need to be in place to enable more articulated forms of joint action, 
like epistemic or temporally extended joint action which targets complex goals. Thus, strictly 
speaking, the term ‘intentional action’ might not be ideal for describing the minimal forms of 
joint action that we are interested in. The term often refers to full-fledged actions that are 
caused by beliefs, desires, and intentions, but our PPR account suggests that minimal forms 
of joint action are not of that kind. At the same time, however, we would like to stress that 
although they are not as sophisticated as full-fledged actions, they are also not as simple as 
purely physical movements like reflexes. They seem to belong to the large intermediate 
category of actions that lie “between reason and reflex” (Gendler, 2012). What turns a jointly 
sub-intentional action into a jointly intentional action? The conjecture is that one of the 
crucial elements is the adoption of the we-perspective. By adopting that perspective, the 
subject is in a position to form beliefs about a group, its preferences, and its ethos, which the 
subject is motivated to foster by her social self. 
Let us now briefly review the main points of this section. We began from the idea that 
self-transformation alone can explain simple joint actions (like those among infants). This 
hypothesis is supported by considerations about the emergence of joint actions among 
  
children and the ontogenesis of the ability to adopt the we-perspective. In this section, we 
rejected a doxastic account of self-transformation and defended a Millikan-inspired account 
according to which the social self is a PPR. On this basis, we have argued, in contrast to 
Pacherie, that PPR can bypass shared intentions in causing minimal joint actions like those 
young children engage in. Finally, one can also establish that the social self’s crucial role is 
preserved even in complex interactions: as we have seen, while reviewing Petersson’s work 
in Section 1 and in the discussion on the discursive dilemma in Section 2, engaging in 
collective action as a full-fledged group member requires, in addition to complex cognitive 
abilities, a perspicuous self-understanding to achieve closure between attitudes in the I- and 
we-form. This self-understanding, we can now infer, comes under the guise of a PPR.15 
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
We conclude by highlighting three implications of our discussion for an understanding of 
collective intentionality.  
First, joint actions that run solely on PPRs do not necessitate complex forms of 
mentalizing. This is not to say, however, that simpler forms of social understanding do not 
play a role. In fact, some of the cues that trigger the production of PPR may well involve 
understanding the states of other individuals. More specifically, if, as we have suggested, 
joint attention is one of the preconditions of group identification and if social understanding 
is required for partaking in episodes of joint attention, then this understanding must be an 
enabling factor in the process that leads to joint actions (see Zahavi & Rochat, 2015; Zahavi, 
2015).  
Second, PPRs are representations which can easily spread and propagate in the 
following sense: Millikan highlights that the PPR-consuming system (i.e., the system that 
uses PPRs for some purposes) does not have to be restricted to the PPR-producing system 
(i.e., the system that generates PPRs in response to some inputs) (Millikan, 2004, 2005). This 
may explain why cooperative behavior is “contagious”—that is, why the expectation that the 
other group identifies (modelled by condition (i’) in Pacherie’s theory) is fulfilled more often 
than not. Behaving as a group member induces similar behavior in others. 
Our third and last implication concerns the question of whether group identification is 
under an agent’s rational control. Views on this point diverge in the literature: while authors 
like Bacharach (2006) and Petersson (2017) contend that group identification is not under an 
agent’s control, others argue that, at least in certain circumstances, this may be the case (see 
Tuomela, 2013, p. 195). Our theory allows for a more fine-grained hypothesis: the adoption 
of a group perspective as a specific mentalizing activity is under an agent’s control. In 
contrast, PPRs are brute psychological facts: group identification in the sense of self-
transformation is not under an agent’s direct rational control.16 It is not up to an agent 





1  The socio-psychological characterization of group or social identification may serve 
as a preliminary or working definition of this concept. On this understanding, ‘group 
identification’ refers to “the process whereby an individual internalizes some form of 





long-lasting or ephemeral” (Turner, 1982, p. 18). Integral to this definition is the idea 
that, when this specific transformation in self-understanding occurs—that is, when the 
subject acquires a social self (Brewer & Kramer, 1997)—a subjective form of group 
membership is established: “we are concerned here with group membership as a 
psychological and not a formal-institutional state, with the subjective sense of 
togetherness, we-ness, or belongingness” (Turner, 1982, p. 16). 
2  This hypothesis is supported by the observation that children of 21-27 months of age 
encourage their partners to reengage when they disengage from joint activities. 
Importantly, the solicitation occurs equally often regardless of whether the goal of the 
activity, for its achievement, requires the causal contribution of the partner or not (in 
the latter case, the child would be able to reach the goal by herself). The observation 
is taken to show that the child understands the activity as a cooperative endeavor and 
the interactant as an intentional partner (Warneken et al., 2012; AUTHOR). 
3  Other ToM tests (i.e., so-called “indirect” tests; see Low & Perner, 2012) predate the 
emergence of these abilities. For instance, Rubio-Fernández and Geurts (2013) show 
that children of two and a half years of age have already acquired a ToM. 
4  Accounts which include a common knowledge condition concur that mindreading 
abilities are required for shared intentions (see Bratman, 1993; Gilbert, 1997; Miller, 
2001; Tuomela, 2007, among others). However, it is debated whether the notion of 
common knowledge should be understood in a deflationatory or non-deflationary 
sense and whether this condition is required at all. For instance, Blomberg (2016) 
denies that shared intentions require common knowledge (see also Ludwig, 2016). 
5  Butterfill (2012) has explored another option to accommodate those two insights from 
developmental psychology: rather than invoking the notion of shared intentions to 
explain minimal joint actions, Butterfill develops a theory of these actions based on 
shared goals (where a goal is not the content of an intention but the outcome to which 
the action is directed). Our argument aligns with Butterfill’s theory insofar as we 
dismiss the notion of shared intention to explain minimal joint action, but it diverges 
from it insofar as we assign that explanatory role to PPRs.  
6  These consequences are all premised on an internalistic understanding of group 
identification according to which group identification is an intra-mental process. 
Externalists about group identification need not subscribe to that idea, and hence, 
their position remains untouched by our arguments. For internalist versus externalist 
approaches in the philosophy of social sciences, see Ross (2014, p. 236ff.). 
7  Recent research has suggested that forms of in-group favoritism may even be 
antecedent. For instance, Kinzler and colleagues (2011) have found that pre-
schoolers, when learning new information, trust speakers with native accents more 
than speakers with different accents. Similarly, Buttelmann and colleagues (2013) 
have shown that, from the age of 14 months, children imitate those speaking in their 
native language (in-group members) more faithfully than those speaking a foreign 
language (out-group members). However, the jury is still out on whether these 
findings illustrate genuine understanding of group membership (Buttelmann et al., 
2013, p. 427). 
8  List and Pettit (2011) rely on this point to show that mentality and thus, for example, 
moral responsibility can be assigned to groups. This is a controversial point (for 
criticisms, see Makela & Miller, 2005; Szigeti, 2013). We will remain entirely neutral 
on whether groups can have intentional attitudes or bear moral responsibility, as 




locutions that attribute mentality (especially intentions) to groups for the sake of 
linguistic simplicity. 
9  “We … achieve an alignment between what the group’s attitudes require of us and 
our own preferences and then act without further reflection whenever our response is 
required. The alignment may be achieved … through explicitly adopting the group’s 
viewpoint—that is, adopting the group’s attitudes as our own” (List & Pettit, 2011, p. 
192).  
10  It is unlikely that the recognition of the rationality of (1) will be sufficient to motivate 
action—for (1) to be effective, it must go together with some of the other normative 
or cognitive factors mentioned above, possibly including a concern for the group. We 
will not explore this issue further; here we are merely concerned with how an 
individual comes to an understanding that (1) is a rational attitude from another 
agent’s point of view. 
11  One could conjecture that this class of actions at least partly overlaps with the class of 
so-called “group actions” (see List & Pettit, 2011). Since we want to remain neutral 
on whether psychological or agentive predicates can be genuinely applied to groups, 
we will not explore this conjecture further. 
12  Millikan (2004) goes on to argue that all representational states in non-human animals 
are PPRs. This claim is controversial because it rules out the possibility of non-human 
animals with DERs such as beliefs. We do not necessarily endorse this part of her 
theory.  
13  These features are shared by what Tamar Gendler calls “aliefs” (Gendler, 2008, 
2012). Aliefs are said to be more primitive than beliefs: “as a class, aliefs are states 
that we share with non-human animals; they are developmentally and conceptually 
antecedent to other cognitive attitudes that the creature may go on to develop” 
(Gendler, 2008, p. 641). They are also not combinatoric: “[alief] is molar: it has, I 
have suggested, a characteristic R–A–B structure, whereby a particular representation 
(R) comes typically to be associated with a characteristic valence or evaluation or 
affective state (A) and with the activation of a behavioral repertoire (B)” (Gendler, 
2012, p. 800). We speculate that the characteristics of aliefs are so similar to those of 
PPRs that “aliefs” and “PPRs” are best viewed as different labels for the same states. 
However, the label “PPR” would be less problematic than the label “alief” from a 
theoretical point of view. For the theoretical problems about Gendler’s 
characterization of aliefs, see, for example, Bayne and Hattiangadi (2013) and Currie 
and Ichino (2012).   
14  The social self is only one motivating factor to engage in a joint action, but there can 
be other factors that counteract or block the motivational force of the social self, 
meaning that even when a social self is activated, the individual may not pursue all 
goals that she perceives as being “ours” (for instance, if the goal is morally 
blameworthy).  
15  Self-transformation and its role in motivating joint actions is described as if it were a 
finite process which, once in motion, made people operate in a completely different 
mode. Obviously, however, any step of this process will be influenced by 
circumstantial factors, which we are not in a position to determine in this paper.  
16  This is not supposed to exclude the possibility for the individual to deliberately create 
situations that increase the likelihood of group identification. Accordingly, there is a 
sense in which group identification could be under the indirect control of the 
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